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1. Introduction 
Financial systems mitigate information and transaction costs. The core functions of financial 
markets and institutions are to facilitate savings mobilization, informationacquisition and 
processing, theefficient allocation of funds and to encourage effectivecorporate governance 
(Levine, 1997). Awell-functioning financial market and efficient financial intermediation can 
spur capital productivity and foster economic growth (Rousseau and Sylla, 1999; Beck, et al., 
2000 and Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Levine, 2005 among others).  
The extant literature discusses the importance of how differently shaped financial 
systems can affect economic development (e.g. Levine et al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004; 
Merton and Bodie, 2004 and Berger et al., 2004). Differences in banking industry structures 
can also differently impact the economy as a whole. For instance, Berger et al. (2004) study 
the role of community banks in the economic growth of 49 countries between 1993 and 2000. 
Their findings suggest that where small, private, domestically-owned banks have larger 
market shares and higher efficiency,this can boost economic growth. In this paper we study 
whether the coexistence of Islamic and conventional banking contributes to financial 
development and economic welfare. 
According to The Banker (2013), Islamic finance is growing at the rate of 15% to 
20% per annum. Globally, Islamic banking assets in commercial banks are set to exceed $1.7 
trillion in 2013 (Ernst & Young, 2013-2014). 
The empirical work in this area has grown accordingly. The extant literature analyzes 
various features of Islamic banking and finance: investment financing (Aggarwal and Yousef, 
2000), securitization (Jobst, 2007), mortgage loans (Ebrahim, 2009), stability (Čihák and 
Hesse, 2010), relationship banking (Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü, 2011), business models 
(Beck et al., 2013), risk (Abedifar, et al., 2013), efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014; Saeed and 
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Izzeldin, 2014), loan default rates (Baele et al., 2014), mutual funds (Abdelsalam et al., 2014) 
and valuation (Elnahass, et al., 2014)
1
.  
However, there are few studies on the role and relative importance of Islamic banking 
in the transformation of the banking and finance sectors of respective countries. Using a 
sample of 20 Muslim countries for the 2000-2005 period, Gheeraert (2014) shows that 
development of Islamic banking sector boosts the whole banking system. Gheeraert and 
Weill (2014) claim that the development of Islamic banking improves macroeconomic 
efficiency. Islamic banking has changed the financial structure of many countries by 
introducing a dual financial system in which both Islamic and conventional institutions 
operate. This paper attempts to fill the void by investigating the characteristics of Islamic 
banking from the finance-growth perspective.  
Islamic banks offer financial products and services that are compatible with Islamic 
doctrine,which allows Muslim individuals and firms with religious concerns to have access to 
finance or move from an informal to a formal financial system. In short, Islamic banks can 
mitigate financial exclusion and bring financial services to a wider population. This can also 
promote better strategiesfor poverty alleviation (Rajan, 2006).  
Changes in market structure may affect banks' performance. In a dual-banking 
system, Islamic and conventional banks do not merely play a supplementary role to one 
another, they compete with each other for clients and investors. Whether and how 
conventional banks are affected by the presence of Islamic banks is an important issue from 
the policy-making perspective and we examine how the efficiency of conventional banks is 
affected when they operate alongside Islamic banks. 
We focus on commercial banking industries in 22 Muslim countries with dual-
banking systems during the 1999–2011 period. Overall, we find that the effect of a dual-
                                                          
1
For a review of the literature, please refer to Abedifar et al. (2015). 
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banking system (where Islamic banks operate alongside their conventional counterparts) on 
financial development, economic growth and poverty alleviation depends on the institutional 
environment.Thisis examined in our study from three perspectives: religion, wealth and 
culture. Our results show that a higher market share of medium-size Islamic banks is 
associated with: greater funding mobilization and credit allocation, economic growth and 
poverty alleviation in countries with relatively greater proportions of Muslims in their 
populations; countries with a comparatively higher uncertainty avoidance index;and countries 
with lower GDP per capita. Our bank-level analyses reveal a positive relationship between 
the presence of large Islamic banks and the efficiency of conventional banks in 
predominantly Muslim countries.In more religiously diverse Muslim countries, the efficiency 
of conventional banks is positively linked to the market share of conventional banks with 
Islamic window/branches.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research 
motivation and econometric specifications, section 3 describes our sample of observations, 
and section 4 discusses the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Research Motivation and Econometric Specifications 
2.1. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ECONOMIC WELFARE  
We study the relationship between the coexistence of Islamic banks and conventional banks 
and national financial development in terms of savings mobilization and funds allocation. We 
also explore the link between the presence of Islamic banks and economic growth, income 
inequality, and poverty alleviation.  
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2.1.1. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
Many Muslims do not use traditional financial products and services, because they believe 
these conflict with their religious beliefs. They may use financial services provided by the 
informal market.
2
 A number of surveys highlight that Muslims prefer Sharia-compliant 
financial products and services. In Algeria, for instance, a study shows that around 20.7% of 
micro-enterprise owners do not apply for loans primarily due to religious concerns (Frankfurt 
School of Finance and Management, 2006). In Indonesia, around 49% of the rural population 
of East Java prefers Islamic finance and believes that interest is prohibited (C.G.A.P., 2008). 
Honohan (2008) finds that in member countries of the Islamic Development Bank (i.e., all 
OIC
3
-member countries except Guyana) only 28 percent of the total adult population uses 
formal or semi-formal financial products and services for deposit and borrowing activities.  
Given the relatively low access to financial institutions and products in most Muslim 
countries (e.g. Honohan, 2008), there is considerable potential for Islamic finance, by moving 
lenders and borrowers from the informal to formal markets.
4
 Hence, Islamic banks are 
expected to play a complementary role to conventional banks in intermediating financial 
resources.Islamic and conventional banking may also substitute for each other; for example, 
Islamic banks can absorb lenders and borrowers from conventional financial institutions. We 
therefore explore whether the presence of Islamic banks can increasefinancial intermediation. 
First, we investigate how the deposits in the banking industry and financial system are 
affected by the presence of Islamic banks.We then examine the relationship between the 
volume of private credit and the market share of Islamic banks. 
 
                                                          
2
 Often known as the curb market. 
3
 Organization of Islamic Conference; please refer to http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/home/?lan=en 
4
 Some economists believe that curb markets are more efficient in savings and investment intermediation (van 
Wijnbergen, 1983; Taylor, 1983; Buffie, 1984); however, Fry (1988) argues that informal markets are not 
necessarily as efficient as formal markets. Chandavarkar (1992) claims that curb markets are unorganized and 
do not play a substantial role in financial-resource intermediation to boost economic growth. The main problem 
for examining the potential contribution of informal markets to economic growth is the lack of data.   
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2.1.2. Economic Growth 
Whether the presence of Islamic banks can affect economic growth is an empirical question 
that we attempt to address in this study. Existing studies show that religious individuals are 
more risk-averse than other agents (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Osoba, 2003; Hilary and 
Hui, 2009). Similarly, Islamic financial institutions might be more risk-averse than their 
conventional counterparts. Therefore, they might limit entrepreneurship by encouraging 
borrowers to select low-risk projects or to invest excessively in tangible assets. Furthermore, 
Islamic financiers may prefer to allocate funds to the real economy, becausethey are not 
authorized to allocate financial resources to speculative activities.  
 
2.1.3. INCOME INEQUALITY and POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
A profit-maximization strategy encourages financial institutions to establish branches and 
networks in large cities or capital-oriented areas rather than in areas with low population 
density or low income. This may leave the poor withrelatively limited access to financial 
products and services such as deposits and loans. Additionally, some poor Muslims may 
prefer to bank with Sharia-compliant financial institutions. The lack of access to finance can 
exacerbate poverty (Ayyagari et al, 2008). The limited access of the poor to finance is 
addressed by the microfinance literature (see Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005 
among others),where governments might be encouraged to promote financial services in rural 
and low income areas.  The government of India, for instance, adopted a policy, during the 
period 1977-1990, to support the opening bank branches in areas without any 
bank
5
.Thatpolicy has been associated with a 60% reduction in rural poverty (Burgess and 
Pande, 2005).  
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The government allowed establishment of a new branch in districts that had already benefited from bank 
presence provided that the bank opened four branches in areas without bank presence. 
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Rajan (2006) argues that it is better to focus on finance for all rather than to focus 
exclusively on the poor. This is more practical from the political economy perspective
6
 and a 
number of empirical studies show that the poor also benefits from a more generalpolicy. 
Honohan (2004) finds a negative relationship between financial development and headcount 
ratio. Beck et al. (2007) claim that financial deepening not only has a positive effect on 
economic growth, but it also mitigates income inequality and reduces poverty.  
Islam, like other Abrahamic religions (Judaism and Christianity), encourages lending 
that it is free of interest. The motivation for the prohibition of interest is to prevent the 
oppression of the poor. Hence, the availability of Islamic finance may lessen income 
inequality and alleviate poverty, given thatIslamic financial institutions may incorporate 
poverty alleviation in their business strategies. They are expected to have a greater incentive 
to offer financial products and services to poor clients. We therefore expect to find that 
Islamic financiers contribute more to social and development activities than their 
conventional counterparts.  
Alternatively, Islamic financial institutions may offer Sharia-compliant financial 
products and services as part of a marketing strategy to attract clients that are highly 
religious. They might also follow a profit-maximization approach similar to conventional 
financial institutions
7
, so that there would be few differences between Islamic and 
conventional products. Hence, Islamic financial institutions may not be more effective in 
reducing poverty than conventional financial institutions,so it is important to investigate the 
impact of Islamic financial institutions on income inequality and poverty. 
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For instance, microfinance is well practiced only in a few countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and 
Thailand (Honohan, 2004). 
7
 We follow existing literature (see e.g. Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000 Chong and Liu, 2009; Beck et al, 2013 and 
Abedifar et al, 2013) and assume that Islamic commercial banks follow a profit maximization strategy similar to 
conventional commercial banks within the constraints imposed by Sharia, e.g. prohibition of interest-based 
financial activities. 
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2.1.4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS 
We adopt the following panel specification for our analyses. To control for individual 
unobservable heterogeneity across countries, we use the fixed-effect technique in our 
estimation and cluster standard errors at the country level. 
 
Yj,t = α0 + α11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + α12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + α13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +     
 α21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + α22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + α23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +          
 α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t +  
α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Per_Capitaj,t + α7×Remittance_Inflowj,t + α8×Trendt + εj,t      (1) 
Where j subscript denotes individual countries and t denotes the time dimension.  
Yj,t is our dependent variable. We use the following three proxies for our financial-
intermediation study: total deposits of commercial banks to gross domestic product (GDP) 
ratio (Bank Deposit); total deposits in the financial system to GDP ratio (Financial System 
Deposit) representing the volume of deposits mobilization; and the ratio of private credit to 
GDP (Private Credit) as a proxy for credit allocation. 
For our economic growth analysis, we employ the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita, calculated using the purchasing power parity (PPP) method (Economic Growth) as the 
dependent variable (Yj,t). 
We explore income inequality and poverty alleviation using five proxies: the Gini 
index (Gini); the share of people with less than $1.25 a day based on PPP in the total 
population (Poverty Ratio International); the percentage of people below the national poverty 
line (Poverty Ratio National); the intensity of poverty by the percentage who live on less than 
$1.25 a day (Poverty Gap International); and the percentage of people who live below the 
rural poverty line (Poverty Ratio Rural). 
ISB Shareis our variable of interest andrepresents the assets of commercial Islamic 
banks as a percentage of the total assets of the whole commercial banking industry. Islamic 
banking can enter the financial system in two ways: The establishment of pure Islamic banks 
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or by launching Islamic branches/window in conventional banks. The first way increases both 
the size of the financial sector and the number of financial institutions, yielding higher market 
competition.The second way increases the size of the financial system with no increase in the 
number of participants, resulting in higher market power. Following Beck et al. (2013), we 
split Islamic banks into three categories: Small, Medium and Large. We define Small banksas 
those with total assets below $100 million. Medium banks are thosewith total assets above 
$100 million and below $1 billion. Large banks are thosewith total assets above $1 billion. 
We are interested in the role of pure Islamic banks in financial systems and the 
economy. We control for the Islamic branches/windowby including the share of Small, 
Medium and Large Islamic window banks (ISW Share) in the total assets of the commercial 
banking sector. The benchmark is then the share of pure commercial conventional banks in 
the total assets of the banking system.  
We try to capture the heterogeneities associated with the structure of the banking 
sector in terms of ownership, using the share of total assets of foreign and state-owned banks 
in total assets (Foreign Bank Share and State Bank Share). The benchmark is the share of 
domestic private banks in total assets.  
We use fixedeffects technique for our estimation,whichaccounts for unobservable 
factors.We control for a number of macroeconomic and institutional environment factors 
such as inflation, remittance inflow, GDP per capita, culture and religion. Inflation is 
represented in our model by the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator (Inflation);it affects 
financial development and economic welfare (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002). We also 
consider remittance inflowas a percentage of GDP (Remittance Inflow) in our model. 
Overseas remittance and capital inflow has been increased over time and may influence our 
variables of interest. Heterogeneity across countries due to differences in incomeis captured 
by introducing GDP per capital measured by the PPP approach (Per Capita) into our model. 
10 
 
Moreover, we split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of Per 
Capita to explore the impact of Islamic banking presence in relatively poor countries.  
Religion is represented by the proportion of Muslims in the population (Muslim 
Share).This follows Abedifar et al. (2013), who find significant variations in the performance 
of Islamic banks across countries. We expect the presence of Islamic banks to be influential 
particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. We also expect that the introduction of 
Islamic banks can attract more people to the formal financial sector and more effectively 
contribute to financial deepening in Muslim countries with relatively a higher uncertainty 
avoidance index (Uncertainty Avoidance) issued by Hofstede (2001). Since religion and 
culture are largely time-invariant, we cannot directly use them in our model. We split our 
sample into two parts based on the median value of Muslim Share and Uncertainty 
Avoidance.From that basis, we explore how the market share of Islamic banks is linked to 
financial development and economic welfare in countries.
8
Finally, we add a trend variable. 
Table A1 in the appendix describes the variables of interest, the control variables, and the 
dependent variable. 
 
2.2. EFFICIENCY OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
How the presence of Islamic banks may affect the efficiency of conventional banks is 
an interesting question which we attempt to address in this paper. 
Conventional banks might operate more efficiently in a dual-banking system due to 
competitive pressure. The pressure might be stronger for conventional banks than Islamic 
banks, because of the preference of Muslims with religious concerns for Islamic financial 
institutions. The efficiency of conventional banks might improve with the greater competition 
that is implied by a rise in the market share of Islamic banks. Furthermore, Islamic banks 
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 We are thankful to anonymous referees for their fruitful comments on our modelling. 
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might be inherently less efficient in offering complicated Sharia-compliant financial 
products
9
. Taken together, it is unclear whether a higher market share of Islamic banks can 
significantly alterthe efficiency of conventional banks. 
To investigate the link between the market share of Islamic banks and the efficiency 
of conventional banks, we estimate the following panel specification using the fixed-effect 
technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. The technique accounts for 
individual, unobservable heterogeneity across banks. 
 
Inefficiencyi,t = β0 + β11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + β12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + β13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +  
β21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + β22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + β23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +       
β3×HHIj,t + β4×Domestic_Interest_Ratej,t + β5×Per_Capitaj,t +  
β6×Per_Capita_Growthj,t + β7×Capitali,t + β8×Sizei,t + β9×Credit Riski,t + 
 β10,y × Year_Dummiest,y
12
𝑦=1  + ξi,t                                                                          (2) 
where the i, t and j subscripts denote individual banks, time dimension, and countries, 
respectively. Small, Mediumand Large ISB Share is our variable of interest, and we study its 
impact on Inefficiency of conventional banks operating in a dual-banking system.  
Inefficiency(our dependent variable) is represented by the ratio of total noninterest 
expense to total operating income. We control for macroeconomic factors such as market 
concentration together with bank-level controls. Because the Hausman test suggests the use 
of the fixed-effect technique, we do not include ownership dummies in our model. Besides 
controlling for the market share of Small, Mediumand LargeISW Share, we introduce four 
country-level variables to capture cross-country variations. We control for the impact of 
banking-sector concentration by adding the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to our model. 
The relationship between market concentration and efficiency is not clear ex ante. On the one 
hand, in more concentrated markets, banks have less incentive to increase their efficiency 
(Quite Life Hypothesis proposed by Hicks, 1935).On the other hand, more efficient banks 
                                                          
9
Some studies show that Islamic financial products are more expensive than conventional ones (e.g. Baele et al, 
2014). This could be because of higher inefficiency of Islamic banks or extra rents that Islamic banks extract 
from their clients for offering Sharia-compliant financial products. 
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gain larger market shares that may lead to greatermarket concentration (Efficient-Structure 
Hypothesis proposed by Demsetz, 1973). 
We take into account the level of domestic interest rates (Domestic Interest Rate). The 
extant literature shows the influence of domestic interest rates on banks’ risk appetite (Dell’ 
Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Delis and Kouretas, 2010; 
Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2013). On one hand, banks have a greater risk-
taking appetite when interest rates are low.On the other hand, an increase in interest rates can 
adversely affect borrowers’ ability to repay loans (Jarrow and Turnbull, 2000; Carling et al., 
2007; Drehmann et al., 2010; and Alessandri and Drehmann, 2010). Finally, we try to capture 
the possible impact of income level and growth by including GDP per capita (Per Capita) 
and growth in GDP per capita (Per Capita Growth).  
We also control for bank-level heterogeneities. We include the share of equity capital 
in total assets (Capital). On one hand, an increase in equity can lower moral-hazard problems 
and increase banks’ monitoring incentives (Berger et al., 1995,). On the other hand, higher 
equity can increase banks’ risk-taking capacity. Equity capital can be considered a risk-
aversion proxy (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Koetter and 
Noth, 2013) and banks with higher capital ratios expect higher returns. Jensen (1986) and 
Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that when capital is more expensive than debt (at the margin), 
management might reduce operating costs to offset the higher costs of the increase in capital 
required by regulators. Alternatively, lower interest expense may weaken attempts to control 
operating expenses. Therefore, the impact of capital on efficiency is unclear. 
We consider the effect of size in our study by using the logarithm of total assets (Size) 
as the proxy. Larger banks can benefit from scale economies and diversification (Hughes et 
al., 2001). They may target riskier activities where there is a benefit from safety-net subsidies 
(Kane, 2010). Higher competition pressure might arise where they have larger and more 
13 
 
transparent clients with relatively easier access to capital markets. Larger banks may also use 
different technologies and business models for their operations. Thus, bank efficiency might 
varyacross banks ofdifferent size.We also take into account credit risk as represented by non-
performing loans to gross loans ratio (Credit Risk): a bank thatdoes not efficiently monitor its 
loan activities, is unlikely to be efficient in its operations (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Finally, we capture year fixed effects using twelve year-dummy variables.
10
 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. DATA 
Our empirical analysis is based on country-level and bank-level data for 22 Muslim 
countries
11
 with dual-banking systems during the 1999–2011 period. We collect the data on 
proportion of Muslim population from the web-site of Pew Research Centre
12
;uncertainty 
avoidance index is obtained from Hoftstede (2001); the economic freedom index is retrieved 
from the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, and other country-level data are 
collected from the World Bank website.  
The bank-level data areobtained from the Bankscope database. Bankscope classifies 
banks as commercial, Islamic, or other.An Islamic bank might be a commercial or a non-
commercial bank. Moreover, some conventional banks have Islamic 
windows/branches/wings (Islamic Window Bank), and cannot be classified as either Islamic 
or conventional banks. Therefore, to ensure data accuracy, we retrieve information on bank 
type from each bank’s website.  
                                                          
10
 The sample covers 13 years; however, however, we drop one year-dummy to avoid perfect multicolinearity 
and use twelve year-dummies in our estimations. 
11
Among 57 Muslim countries (i.e. OIC-member countries), we find Islamic commercial banking in 24 
countries. In the following 22 Muslim countries Islamic and conventional commercial banks operate alongside 
each other (they have a dual-banking system): Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In Iran and Sudan, the commercial banking system is fully Islamic. 
12
Please visit http://pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx 
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3.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We use two subsamples of countries defined on the basis of the median value of 
Muslim Share. Muslim Share ranges from 51.9% in Lebanon to 99.8% in Tunisia. The 
median value is 95%. Countries below the median value are classified as “More Religiously 
Diverse Countries” and the others(in which the Muslim populationisat least 95%) are called 
“Predominantly Muslim Countries”. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our samplesofMore Religiously Diverse 
CountriesandPredominantly Muslim Countries. Islamic banks of different sizes have greater 
market shares in More Religiously Diverse Countries (18.54%, 25.48% and 
21.13%respectively  for Small, Mediumand Large Islamic banks.In Predominantly Muslim 
Countries, the corresponding percentages are 10.68%, 20% and 8.20% respectively for Small, 
Mediumand Large Islamic banks). In both samples, the market share of Medium Islamic 
banks is higher than forSmalland Large Islamic banks. The market share of LargeIslamic 
window banks is the highest in both sub-samples. The market shares of Medium and Large 
Islamic window banks are higher in More Religiously Diverse Countries. Foreigners have 
greater ownership of commercial banks in Predominantly Muslim Countries (29.95% versus 
19.45%).However, governments in More Religiously Diverse Countrieshave slightly larger 
stakes in their commercial banking systems (17.23% versus 16.16%). The HHI index shows 
that commercial banking industry is less concentrated in this group of countries. 
The banking system in More Religiously Diverse Countriesis more developed than in 
Predominantly Muslim Countries.Bank Deposit, Financial System Deposit and Private 
Creditare 64.88%, 64.60% and 50.81% of GDP in More Religiously Diverse Countries.The 
corresponding percentages for Predominantly Muslim Countries are 35.19%, 36.96% and 
28.09%.  
15 
 
We observe little difference between the two groups of countries in terms of the 
annual growth rate (Per Capita)i.e. 1.65% and 1.81%, respectively.We do not observe a 
significant difference between the two samples of countries in terms of the Gini index, 
Poverty Ratio International, and Poverty Gap International. However, the headcount ratio 
(calculated based on the national poverty line) and the poverty in rural areas are higher for 
More Religiously Diverse Countries. 
The fourth part of the table reports other country-level indicators. The Muslim Share 
is on average 78.22% and 97.88% across our two sub-samples. Per Capita is significantly 
higher for More Religiously Diverse Countries(about $28 thousand versus $6.67 thousand). 
The Uncertainty Avoidancefor More Religiously Diverse Countries is lower. We do not 
observe a significant difference between the two samples in terms of Inflation (7.5% in More 
Religiously Diverse Countries and about 9% in Predominantly Muslim Countries). Both 
samples experience almost the same level of Remittance Inflow (about 6% of GDP).Overall, 
our descriptive statistics indicate that the two samples have different institutional and 
economic environments. For instance More Religiously Diverse Countries have a more 
developed finance sector, a higher GDP per capita, more economic freedom, a lower 
uncertainty avoidance index and a higher share of Islamic banks in their commercial banking 
market. 
The last part of table 1 describes our bank-level variables for conventional banks. 
Conventional banks in More Religiously Diverse Countries are smaller in size, are more cost-
efficient,have a lower capital to asset ratio (Capital) and Credit Risk.  
 [TABLE 1] 
Table A2 in the appendix provides the breakdowns on number and average size of 
different types of banks across our 22 countries. The correlation matrix presented in PANEL 
A of Table A3 in the appendix shows no major multicollinearity problems. We study the role 
16 
 
of Islamic banks in PredominantlyMuslim Countries, low-income Muslim countries and 
Muslim countries with comparatively high Uncertainty Avoidance on the basis of the median 
value of Muslim Share, Per Capitaand Uncertainty Avoidance, respectively. PANEL B in 
Table A3 illustrates the pair-wise correlations, which do not show any high correlations 
between these three sub-samples of countries
13
.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. ISLAMIC BANKING IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES 
We explore the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and the financial 
development and economic welfare for the sample of Predominantly Muslim Countries.We 
estimate Equation (1) using the fixed-effect technique, and illustrate the results in table 2. The 
first three columns display our results on financial development analysis (i.e. funding 
mobilization and credit allocation). In the first column, we use Bank Deposit as the dependent 
variable and regress it on the market share of Small, MediumandLargeIslamic banks  and a 
set of control variables, including Small, Mediumand LargeISW Share, Foreign Banks Share, 
State Banks Share, Inflation,Per Capita, Remittance Inflow and Trend. The results show a 
significantly positive relationship between the market share of MediumIslamic banks and 
Bank Deposit. Large ISW Share also shows apositive and significant association with the 
dependent variable. As expected, Inflationis negatively associatedwith Bank Deposit. The 
Trend variable has a positive coefficient.  
In the second column, we replace Bank Deposit with Financial System Deposit as the 
dependent variable. The results are in line with our finding in the first column. The market 
share of MediumIslamic banks is positively linked to the size of funding mobilization at 
                                                          
13
We also consider economic freedom in our analysis but because the sample of countries below the median 
value of the Economic Freedom Index provided by the Heritage Foundation is highly correlated (0.81) with the 
sample of Low Income Countries we exclude this dimension per se from our estimations. 
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thefinancial system level. Column (3) presents our analysis for Private Credit, representing 
credit allocation to private sector. The results show a positive relationship between Medium 
ISB and Private Credit. Overall, the findings show a significantly positive link between the 
market share of MediumIslamic banks and size of financial intermediation in Predominantly 
Muslim Countries. 
In columns (4) to (9), we explore the relationship between the market share of Islamic 
banks and economic welfare (i.e. economic growth, income inequality and poverty 
alleviation). In column (4), we use the annual growth rate of GDP per capita as a proxy for 
economic growth (Economic Growth) and find little relationship between the presence of 
Islamic banks and Economic Growth. However, we find a significantly positive association 
between Small ISW Share and Economic Growth. The results also show that Economic 
Growth increases with a rise in Per Capita. Column (5) presents our income inequality 
analysis as represented by the Gini index (Gini).Medium ISB Shareshowsa significantly 
negative link with Gini. We also observe that an increase in the market share of LargeIslamic 
Window Banksis associated with a decrease in Gini, whereas Small ISW Share is positively 
linked to income inequality. 
In columns (6) to (9), we examine the relationship between the market share of 
Islamic banks and our proxies for poverty (Poverty Ratio International, Poverty Ratio 
National, Poverty Gap International and Poverty Ratio Rural). Our analyses show a negative 
association ofMedium ISB Sharewith Poverty Ratio National(poverty ratio defined based on 
national poverty line)and also Poverty Ratio Rural (poverty ration in the rural area).  
Overall, we find that an increase in market share of MediumIslamic banks in 
PredominantlyMuslim Countriesisassociated with a higher funding mobilization and credit 
allocation, but lower income inequality, percentage of population below the national poverty 
line and headcount ratio in rural area. We carry out similar analysesfor More Religiously 
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Diverse Countries and find no significant relationship between the presence of Islamic banks 
and our proxies for financial development and economic welfare (except for the negative link 
between Medium ISB Shareand Private Credit)
14
.  
[TABLE 2] 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate our model using GMM panel estimation 
technique and find similar results
15
. 
 
4.2. ISLAMIC BANKING IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
Table 3 illustrates the estimation of Equation (1) using the sample of Low Income Countries 
(i.e. countries with Per Capita below the median value $6,364)
16
. The first three columns 
refer to our funds mobilization and credit allocation analysis. The results show that Medium 
ISB Share is positively associated with our funds mobilization proxies (i.e. Bank Deposit and 
Financial System Deposit). However, we find little associationbetween the presence of 
Islamic banks and credit allocation as represented by Private Credit.   
In columns (4) to (9), we explore the relationship between the market share of Islamic 
banks and economic growth, income inequality and poverty. The results show that a higher 
market share of Medium size Islamic banks is associated with higher Economic Growth, a 
lower percentage of people below the international poverty line (Poverty Ratio International), 
lower poverty intensity (Poverty Gap International) and a lower headcount ratio in the rural 
area (Poverty Ratio Rural). However, we find almost no associationbetween our proxy for 
income inequality (i.e. Gini) and the market share of Islamic banks.  
Overall, we find that the presence of Islamic banks is positively linked with financial 
sector development, economic growth and poverty alleviation in Low Income Countries.  
                                                          
14
 The results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
15
The results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
16
 Since we make sub-samples of countries based on Per Capita, we exclude the variable Per Capita from our 
model in this sub-section. 
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[TABLE 3] 
 
4.3.ISLAMIC BANKING IN HIGH UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE COUNTRIES 
Table 4 illustrates the estimation of Equation (1) using the sample of High Uncertainty 
Avoidance Countries (i.e. countries with an uncertainty avoidance index above the median 
value which is 68). We analysefunds mobilization and credit allocation in the first three 
columns. Medium ISB Shareshowsa positive association with Bank Deposit, Financial System 
Deposit and Private Credit.   
In columns (4) and (5), we find no significant relationship between the presence of 
Islamic banks and economic growth and our income inequality index. We explore the 
relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and poverty indices in columns (6) to 
(9). We find a negative associationofMedium ISB Sharewiththe percentage of the population 
below the national poverty line (Poverty Ratio National) and also headcount ratio in the rural 
area (Poverty Ratio Rural).  
Overall, we find that the market share of Medium size Islamic banks is positively 
linked with financial sector development. We also find some evidence,which suggests that 
the growth of Islamic banking is associated with poverty alleviation particularly in rural 
areas. As a further robustness check, we exclude Lebanon as it suffered from civil war during 
our period of study and investigate whether the findings still hold. The results indicate no 
significant change
17
. 
[TABLE 4] 
 
4.4. OTHER ISSUES 
4.4.1. ISLAMIC BANKING IN HIGH INFLAITON COUNTRIES 
                                                          
17
 The results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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It can be argued that Islamic banks might have a different impact during periods of high 
inflation. Islamic banks might hold more cash reserves, because they have some 
limitation for investment, e.g. they cannot invest in interest-base bonds (see e.g. Abedifar 
et al., 2013); however, they might use more commodities as collateral, because they tend 
to finance the real economy and tangible assets. Hence, the link between the presence of 
Islamic banks and financial development and economic welfare during a relatively high 
inflationary period is not straightforward.On the one hand, greater cash reserves holding 
would devalue Islamic banks’ assets to a greater extentthan for their conventional 
counterparts.On the other hand, widespread use of commodities can be a safe cushion 
against inflation. To address this issue, we estimate our model (Equation (1)) for a sub-
sample of countries that experienced relatively high inflation (on the basis of the median 
value of inflation in our samples 7.09%). The results are shown in table A4 of the 
appendix. We find no significant relationship between the market share of Islamic banks 
and financial development; however, we observe a negative link between Large ISB 
Share and Economic Growth. 
 
4.4.2. ISLAMIC BANKING BEFORE AND AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
We investigate whether and how our findings change when we exclude the global financial 
crisis of 2007-08 from our analysis. We consider two sub-periods for Predominantly Muslim 
Countries: the period before the global financial crisis (i.e. 1999-2007) and during the global 
recession thereafter (2008-2012
18
). The results are presented in Table A5 of the appendix. We 
give our estimatesof the model (Equation (1)) for the two periods: columns (1) to (4) and (5) 
to (8). The first four columns show a positive link between Medium ISB Share and funds 
mobilization proxies (i.e. Bank Deposit and Financial System Deposit) as well as Economic 
                                                          
18
 A number of countries in our sample also experienced the turmoil caused by the so-called “Arab Spring” in 
late 2010. 
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Growth. The relationship is economically stronger than for the whole period (see sub-section 
4.1.) 
In the recession period, we find that the market share of Small Islamic banks is 
positively associated with funds mobilization and credit allocation, whereas Large ISB 
Shareshowsa negative link with our proxies for financial development. The estimations show 
no significant link between the presence of Islamic banks and economic growth.  
 
4.5. EFFICIENCY OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS  
We estimate Equation (2) using the ratio of total noninterest expense to total operating 
income (Inefficiency) as the proxy. We estimate our model for More Religiously Diverse 
CountriesandPredominantly Muslim Countries subsamples. Table 5 presents the estimations.  
 Columns (1) to (4) illustrate the analysis for More Religiously Diverse Countries. In 
the first column we regress Inefficiency on Small, Mediumand Large ISB Share while 
controlling for Small, Mediumand Large ISW Share. Country-level variables including HHI, 
Domestic Interest Rate, Per Capita, and Per Capita Growth are added to the model in 
column (2). In column (3), we control for Capital, Sizeand Credit Risk of conventional banks. 
In column (4) we add year-dummies. The results show no significant relationship between the 
market share of Islamic banks and Inefficiency.However, we find that Medium and Large ISW 
Share is negatively linked to Inefficiency which suggests that in countries with a relatively 
lower Muslim share in their population, conventional banksmaybe more influenced by 
Islamic Window Banks. We also find that an increase in Per Capita is associated with a 
decline in Inefficiency.However, HHI showsno relationship with the dependent variable and 
hence does not support either the Quite-Life or Efficient-Structure hypotheses. 
 In columns (5) to (8) we estimate our model for Predominantly Muslim Countries 
with the same specifications ascolumns (1) to (4). We find that Large ISB Share is negatively 
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linked to Inefficiency. The negative coefficient of Medium ISB Sharebecomes insignificant 
when we add our bank-level control variables in column (8).Contrary to our finding for More 
Religiously Diverse Countries, Islamic Window Banksshowno significant relationship with 
the dependent variable. Finally, we observe that banks with more Credit Risk are less 
efficient. 
[TABLE 5] 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the presence of Islamic commercial banks and their 
conventional counterparts in the same market can foster the development of the overall 
commercial banking sector and economic welfare. We also explore the possible implications 
for conventional banks operating in a dual-banking system. 
During recent decades, as Islamic banking has grown in many Muslim countries, a 
dual-banking system has emerged in which both Islamic and conventional banks share the 
market. Islamic financial institutions offer Sharia-compatible financial products and 
services.This could have lessened the potential for financial exclusion, by reaching out to 
Muslims who avoid conventional borrowing and lending instruments. 
Islamic banks behave differently from their conventional counterparts in several 
ways. Specifically, they are not authorized to engage with speculative activities. They must 
act as agents of their investment accountholders by allocating their savings to profitable 
projects. They tend tobe more risk-averse and have a stronger preference for investing in the 
real economy. Moreover, the coexistence of Islamic and conventional banking could increase 
the efficiency of the whole banking system by improving competition. 
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We study 22 Muslim countries with a dual-banking system during the 1999–2011 
period. Due to considerable heterogeneity,we split the countries into two subsamples based 
on three factors: the share of the Muslims in population, population’s wealth and culture. 
 We find that the market share of medium-size Islamic banks in predominantly Muslim 
countries is positively linked with funds mobilization and private credit allocation, and 
negatively linked with income inequality, percentage of population below the national 
poverty line and headcount ratio in the rural area.The analysis of relatively low income 
countries shows that the presence of medium-size Islamic banks is associated with a higher 
level of funds mobilization, economic growth and poverty alleviation. In countries with a 
relatively high uncertainty avoidance index, medium-size Islamic banks have a positive 
relationship with funds mobilization and private credit allocation and a negative association 
with headcount ratio based on national poverty line and poverty ratio in rural area.  
 We also investigate the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and the 
efficiency of conventional banks. We find that the market share of large Islamic banks is 
positively linked with the efficiency of conventional banks in predominantly Muslim 
countries. However, in more religiously diverse Muslim countries, the market share of 
conventional banks with Islamic window/branches is positively linked to the efficiency of 
purely conventional banks. 
 Overall, the results are consistent with the view that the presence of Islamic banks can 
foster access to finance and financial deepening, and improve economic welfare particularly 
in countries with a predominantly Muslim population,higher uncertainty avoidance index and 
acomparatively low GDP per capita. The findings are in line with the existing literature 
onfinance and development. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1.Variable Description 
 
This table presents descriptions of variables used in this study. 
Variables Description Source 
Commercial Bank Structure  
Small ISB Share 
Small Islamic banks’ assets as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Small Islamic 
banks are Islamic banks with total assets below $100 million. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Medium ISB 
Share 
Medium Islamic banks’ assets as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Medium 
Islamic banks are Islamic banks with total assets above $100 million and below $1 billion. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Large ISB Share 
Large Islamic banks’ assets as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Large Islamic 
banks are Islamic banks with total assets above $1 billion. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Small ISW Share 
Total assets of small commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products as a 
percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Small commercial banks are banks with total 
assets below $100 million. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Medium ISW 
Share 
Total assets of medium-size commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products as 
a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Medium-size commercial banks are banks 
with total assets above $100 million and below $1 billion. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Large ISW 
Share 
Total assets of large commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products as a 
percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Large commercial banks are banks with total 
assets above $1 billion. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Foreign Banks 
Share 
Foreign-owned bank assets as a percentage of total assets of commercial banks. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
State Banks 
Share 
State-owned bank assets as a percentage of total assets of commercial banks. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
HHI 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration: 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐 ,𝑡 = 100 ×
  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑐  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡 ,𝑐
𝑛
𝑖=1  
2𝑛
𝑖=1 . It has a value between 0 and 100. Higher values 
indicate that the market is more concentrated. 
Bankscope and banks’ 
websites. 
Funding Mobilization and Allocation  
Bank Deposit The ratio of commercial bank deposits to GDP. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Financial 
System Deposit 
The ratio of financial system deposits to GDP. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Private Credit The ratio of private credit to GDP. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Economic Growth, Income Inequality & Poverty Index  
Economic 
Growth 
The annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Gini The Gini coefficient used as a measure of income inequality. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Poverty Ratio 
International 
Percentage of population below the international poverty line defined as $1.25 a day (PPP). 
The World Bank 
website. 
Poverty Ratio 
National 
Percentage of population below the national poverty line. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Poverty Gap The intensity of poverty at the international poverty line. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Poverty Ratio 
Rural 
Percentage of rural population below the rural poverty line. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Other Country Level Heterogeneities  
Muslim Share Proportion of Muslims in a country’s population. Pew Research Centre. 
Per Capita GDP per capita (thousands $), measured by PPP approach (constant 2005 international). 
The World Bank 
website. 
Uncertainty Society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. The website of Geert 
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Avoidance Index and Gert Jan Hofstede. 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
It measures the degree of freedom of a country. 
the Heritage 
Foundation and the 
Wall Street Journal. 
Inflation The annual inflation rate measured by GDP deflator. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Remittance 
Inflow 
Remittance inflow to GDP. 
The World Bank 
website. 
Domestic 
Interest Rate 
Deposit interest rate provided by the World Bank website; for years and countries with missing 
observations, the data is obtained from the central bank websites. 
The World Bank 
website and the 
websites of central 
banks. 
Bank-Level Analysis  
Inefficiency The ratio of total noninterest expense to total operating revenue. Bankscope 
Size The logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
Capital The ratio of equity capital to asset. Bankscope 
Credit Risk The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Bankscope 
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Table A2. Commercial Banking Market Structure across Countries 
 
This table presents the average Muslim Share, Change in Per Capita Growth, Number and average size of Islamic, Islamic Window and Conventional Banks for our 22 countries of 
study. 
Countries 
Muslim 
Share 
Change in  
Per Capita Growth 
Number of  
Islamic Banks 
Number of  
Islamic Window Banks 
Number of  
Conventional Banks 
Islamic Banks 
Average Size 
Islamic Window Banks 
Average Size 
Conventional Banks 
Average Size 
Algeria 98.2 -0.07 2 0 8 370 -- 4,520 
Bahrain 81.2 -0.24 4 2 3 4,393 2,124 9,894 
Bangladesh 90.4 0.20 4 7 15 695 1,081 1,575 
Brunei 51.9 -0.19 2 0 1 2,838 -- 856 
Egypt 94.7 -0.35 2 5 17 3,696 4,024 3,750 
Gambia 95.3 -0.90 0 0 3 12 -- 62 
Indonesia 88.1 0.47 3 6 45 891 3,752 3,732 
Iraq 98.9 0.87 2 0 4 616 -- 2,646 
Jordan 98.8 -0.10 2 0 9 972 -- 4,985 
Kuwait 86.4 0.71 2 0 4 8,175 4,797 8,876 
Lebanon 59.7 0.23 1 1 32 906 5,309 2,331 
Malaysia 61.4 -0.02 9 8 11 4,784 8,083 6,426 
Mauritania 99.2 -0.28 1 2 4 74 1,434 1,789 
Pakistan 96.4 -0.01 2 8 7 1,955 3,747 1,333 
Qatar 77.5 0.47 3 0 5 5,419 301 6,446 
Saudi Arabia 97.1 0.75 3 6 1 12,200 15,100 14,600 
Senegal 95.9 -0.38 1 0 9 498 -- 888 
Syria 92.8 0.01 1 0 6 931 -- 12,100 
Tunisia 99.8 -0.53 2 1 9 343 531 4,340 
Turkey 98.6 1.02 2 0 23 4,270 -- 13,600 
UAE 76.0 0.03 7 2 14 4,974 8,431 7,120 
Yemen 99.0 -1.49 3 0 4 777 -- 702 
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TABLE A3.Correlation matrix 
PANEL A. 
This panel presents the pair-wise correlation among the independent variables used in our analysis. 
 
Small ISB 
Share 
Medium ISB 
Share 
Large ISB 
Share 
Small ISW 
Share 
Medium ISW 
Share 
Large ISW 
Share 
Foreign Banks 
Share 
State Banks 
Share 
Inflation Per Capita Remittance Inflow 
Small ISB Share 1.00 
          
Medium ISB Share 0.22 1.00 
         
Large ISB Share 0.12 0.30 1.00 
        
Small ISW Share -0.02 0.02 0.01 1.00 
       
Medium ISW Share 0.06 -0.07 0.20 0.23 1.00 
      
Large ISW Share -0.04 -0.15 -0.07 0.34 0.34 1.00 
     
Foreign Banks Share 0.13 0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.18 -0.17 1.00 
    
State Banks Share -0.02 0.09 0.15 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.27 1.00 
   
Inflation Rate 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.10 1.00 
  
Per Capita 0.05 0.24 0.47 -0.14 -0.05 -0.10 -0.31 0.03 0.09 1.00 
 
Remittance Inflow -0.11 -0.01 -0.16 -0.13 -0.21 -0.26 -0.02 -0.24 -0.20 -0.18 1.00 
 
PANEL B. 
 
This panel presents the pair-wise correlation among the indicators used for our sub-sampling.  
 
Muslim Share 
Above Median Countries 
Per Capita 
Below Median Countries 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
Above Median Countries 
Economic Freedom Index 
Below Median Countries 
Muslim Share - Above Median Countries 1.00 
   
Per Capita - Below Median Countries 0.28 1.00 
  
Uncertainty Avoidance Index - Above Median Countries 0.11 -0.36 1.00 
 
Economic Freedom Index - Below Median Countries 0.28 0.81 -0.36 1.00 
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Table A4. Islamic Banking in High Inflation Countries  
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the equation (1) for the sample of High Inflation Countries:   
Yj,t = α0 + α11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + α12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + α13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +  α21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + α22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + α23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +        
α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t + α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Per_Capitaj,t + α7×Remittance_Inflowj,t + α8×Trendt + εj,t 
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median proportion of Inflation. Countries above the median value are classified in one group (High Inflation Countries). 
The median value is 7.09%.  
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we 
study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation. Columns (4) to (9) present our analysis for economic growth, income 
inequality and poverty index.  
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable definitions. 
 Funding Mobilization and Allocation  Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Poverty Index 
 Bank Deposit Financial System Deposit Private Credit  Economic Growth Gini Poverty Ratio International Poverty Ratio National Poverty Gap International 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Small ISB Share -0.016 -0.016 -0.030  -0.028 -0.046 0.022 -0.016 -0.041*** 
 (-0.72) (-0.65) (-0.82)  (-1.54) (-0.94) (1.26) (-1.07) (-4.13) 
Medium ISB Share 0.071 0.065 0.011  0.023 0.132 -0.139*** 0.048 0.162 
 (1.60) (1.17) (0.14)  (1.00) (0.94) (-6.88) (1.32) (0.42) 
Large ISB Share -0.008 -0.025 -0.039  -0.035** 0.099 0.035 0.097 -0.599 
 (-0.19) (-0.75) (-1.21)  (-2.49) (0.05) (0.91) (0.17) (-0.30) 
Small ISW Share 0.062 0.067 0.030  0.018 -0.083** -0.035** -0.029** -0.190 
 (1.50) (1.67) (1.15)  (1.06) (-3.07) (-2.91) (-2.93) (-0.40) 
Medium ISW Share 0.107 0.127 0.071  0.045 0.464*** -0.331*** 0.149*** -0.224 
 (1.50) (1.68) (0.67)  (1.65) (7.51) (-24.81) (8.65) (-0.51) 
Large ISW Share 0.045 0.053 0.186*  0.028 0.221*** 0.016 0.056** 0.283 
 (0.43) (0.46) (1.85)  (0.97) (4.26) (1.04) (3.13) (0.46) 
Foreign Banks Share -0.140 -0.151 -0.131  0.037 -0.221** -0.079 -0.062*** -0.404*** 
 (-1.70) (-1.58) (-1.23)  (1.03) (-3.09) (-1.04) (-4.48) (-4.09) 
State Banks Share -0.261** -0.272** -0.187  -0.006 -0.337 0.256*** -0.110* -0.049 
 (-2.98) (-2.51) (-1.28)  (-0.16) (-1.63) (5.34) (-2.03) (-0.31) 
Inflation 0.986** 1.046*** 0.366  0.272* 1.991*** -3.075*** 0.653*** -5.362** 
 (2.96) (3.08) (0.90)  (1.83) (10.17) (-13.76) (8.40) (-2.53) 
Per Capita -1.038 -0.604 0.004  0.483** -0.961 -3.111*** -0.231 -8.335* 
 (-0.97) (-0.48) (0.00)  (2.30) (-0.50) (-7.82) (-0.44) (-1.99) 
Remittance Inflow -0.105 -0.137 0.675  0.037 -2.316*** 0.014 -0.768*** 1.784 
 (-0.15) (-0.18) (1.31)  (0.21) (-4.32) (0.05) (-6.72) (1.24) 
Constant 43.092*** 42.294*** 22.465*  -3.375 26.069 55.223*** 6.373 89.010*** 
 (3.64) (3.45) (2.08)  (-1.59) (1.34) (17.81) (1.27) (3.78) 
Observations 79 76 78  83 25 24 25 22 
R-squared 0.370 0.316 0.287  0.216 0.916 0.984 0.909 0.965 
Number of Country 14 14 14  15 9 7 9 7 
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Table A5. Islamic Banking - the Global Financial Crisis  
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the equation (1) before and during the global financial crisis 2007-08:   
Yj,t = α0 + α11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + α12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + α13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +  α21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + α22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + α23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +        
α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t + α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Per_Capitaj,t + α7×Remittance_Inflowj,t + α8×Trendt + εj,t 
We split our sample our sample of Predominantly Muslim Countries into two groups. The analysis of the period before the global financial crisis, i.e. 1999-2007, is presented in 
columns (1) to (4). Columns (5) to (8) present the study of the recent global recession, i.e. 2008-2011.  
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we 
study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation (represented by Bank Deposit, Financial System Deposit and Private Credit). 
Column (4) illustrates the estimation for economic growth. Columns (5) to (8) present the analysis for the period of the global recession, i.e. 2008-2011, with the same 
specifications of columns (1) to (4). 
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable definitions. 
 Before the Global Financial Crisis (1999-2007)  The Global Recession (2008-2011) 
 Bank Deposit Financial System Deposit Private Credit Economic Growth  Bank Deposit Financial System Deposit Private Credit Economic Growth 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Small ISB Share 0.034 0.003 -0.026 0.018  0.318*** 0.309*** 0.163** -0.026 
 (0.66) (0.08) (-1.11) (0.76)  (4.44) (3.84) (2.42) (-0.47) 
Medium ISB Share 0.057*** 0.055* 0.036 0.038***  -0.044* -0.036 -0.026 0.023 
 (4.94) (2.06) (1.72) (3.80)  (-2.08) (-1.32) (-0.67) (0.42) 
Large ISB Share 0.025 -0.007 -0.015 0.025  -0.361*** -0.361*** -0.167** -0.056 
 (0.49) (-0.16) (-0.63) (1.63)  (-4.87) (-4.46) (-3.09) (-0.88) 
Small ISW Share -0.032 -0.032 0.031* -0.006  -0.090 -0.083 -0.135*** 0.023 
 (-1.79) (-1.51) (2.08) (-0.67)  (-1.49) (-1.61) (-3.48) (0.48) 
Medium ISW Share 0.008 0.026 0.101** -0.067**  0.191 0.134 0.078 0.158 
 (0.14) (0.45) (2.81) (-3.18)  (1.46) (1.59) (0.49) (0.65) 
Large ISW Share -0.007 -0.027 -0.054 -0.018  0.259** -0.043 0.270** -0.054 
 (-0.07) (-0.32) (-1.40) (-0.70)  (2.72) (-0.09) (3.00) (-0.54) 
Foreign Banks Share -0.047 -0.053 0.050 0.040  0.126* 0.116 0.171*** -0.049 
 (-0.72) (-0.70) (1.30) (1.32)  (2.18) (1.81) (6.38) (-0.63) 
State Banks Share -0.056 -0.095 0.011 0.064*  0.432*** 0.402** 0.385** -0.058 
 (-0.92) (-1.20) (0.28) (1.84)  (4.12) (2.87) (3.23) (-0.43) 
Inflation -0.051 -0.071 0.064 -0.003  -0.106 -0.093 -0.015 -0.027 
 (-0.68) (-0.84) (1.02) (-0.05)  (-0.96) (-0.71) (-0.51) (-0.30) 
Per Capita -2.000** -2.106* 3.793*** 3.391**  -0.525 -0.391 -1.032** 0.922 
 (-2.64) (-2.07) (3.94) (2.84)  (-1.80) (-0.92) (-2.45) (1.20) 
Remittance Inflow -0.261 -0.195 0.221 0.035  -0.816** -0.808* 0.223 0.664 
 (-0.69) (-0.38) (1.12) (0.26)  (-2.32) (-2.22) (0.22) (1.13) 
Trend 1.544*** 1.516*** 0.370** -0.402**  0.939 0.908 1.459 -1.730 
 (4.47) (4.23) (3.29) (-2.87)  (1.17) (1.11) (1.35) (-1.25) 
Constant 44.794*** 48.327*** 1.555 -16.412**  28.775*** 31.331*** 9.825 10.399 
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 (8.23) (6.53) (0.27) (-2.32)  (5.33) (7.00) (0.68) (0.90) 
Observations 71 68 68 73  37 36 39 40 
R-squared 0.669 0.608 0.754 0.361  0.777 0.769 0.571 0.397 
Number of Country 9 9 9 10  10 10 10 10 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for 22 countries where commercial Islamic and conventional banks both operated for 
the 1999-2011 period. We split the sample into two parts on the basis of the median value of the proportion of Muslims in the 
population.  
 
 
Countries with Muslim percentage of populations 
below the median (95%) 
 
Countries with Muslim percentage of  
populations above the median (95%) 
 
 Variables Obs Mean S.D. Min Max  Obs Mean S.D Min Max T-Stat.† 
Banking System Structure             
 Small ISB Share 128 18.54 35.45 0.00 100.00  143 10.68 25.89 0.00 100.00 2.07** 
 Medium ISB Share 128 25.48 28.97 0.00 100.00  143 20.00 22.44 0.00 83.52 1.73* 
 Large ISB Share 128 21.13 26.95 0.00 100.00  143 8.20 19.72 0.00 100.00 4.46*** 
 Small ISW Share 128 4.68 15.37 0.00 100.00  143 7.40 23.26 0.00 100.00 -1.15 
 Medium ISW Share 128 10.04 13.66 0.00 53.33  143 8.38 21.15 0.00 100.00 0.78 
 Large ISW Share 128 14.02 15.78 0.00 71.66  143 13.01 26.83 0.00 100.00 0.38 
 Foreign Banks Share 130 19.45 19.25 0.00 92.75  136 29.95 28.17 0.00 97.23 -3.56*** 
 State Banks Share 130 17.23 24.72 0.00 100.00  136 16.16 23.84 0.00 98.41 0.36 
 HHI 110 21.94 14.57 6.19 86.17  114 27.99 13.89 9.51 58.69 -3.18*** 
Funding Mobilization and Allocation             
 Bank Deposit 99 64.88 27.86 25.07 139.38  130 35.19 22.17 6.98 105.91 8.71*** 
 Financial System Deposit 87 64.60 25.55 25.07 120.93  121 36.96 22.17 8.92 105.91 8.13*** 
 Private Credit 91 50.81 30.50 9.66 142.85  124 28.09 20.77 3.39 81.85 6.14*** 
Economic Growth, Income Inequality & Poverty Index         
 Economic Growth 130 1.65 4.19 -11.99 14.18  136 1.81 3.58 -17.06 15.73 -0.34 
 Gini 16 35.50 5.22 28.99 46.21  31 37.91 4.59 29.63 47.28 -1.56 
 Poverty Ratio International 19 20.45 18.90 0.00 58.59  31 12.84 14.14 0.00 44.19 1.51 
 Poverty Ratio National 21 18.98 10.83 3.60 48.90  30 26.85 14.03 2.80 55.20 -2.26** 
 Poverty Gap International 19 5.00 5.47 0.00 18.61  31 3.37 4.20 0.00 14.34 1.12 
 Poverty Ratio Rural 21 23.24 10.88 7.10 52.30  24 38.28 17.00 6.80 73.90 -3.58*** 
Other Country Level Heterogeneities         
 Muslim Share 130 78.22 13.48 51.90 94.70  136 97.88 1.46 95.3 99.8 -16.54*** 
 Per Capita 130 28.05 28.06 0.93 133.73  136 6.67 7.47 1.51 49.23 8.41*** 
 Uncertainty Avoidance Index 128 59.66 12.44 36.00 68.00  143 65.91 8.73 54.00 85.00 -4.74*** 
 Economic Freedom Index 121 61.22 8.77 44.30 77.90  143 54.65 11.73 16.80 65.90 5.20*** 
 Inflation 130 7.49 8.16 -24.25 29.02  136 8.99 11.23 -30.14 54.18 -1.25 
 Remittance Inflow 67 6.06 7.27 0.33 25.66  114 6.04 6.13 0.00 22.40 0.03 
Conventional Banks Characteristics          
 Total Assets ($ m) 1917 4,344 8,980 6 83,000  1047 5,981 13,200 0.09 98,700 -3.59*** 
 Inefficiency 1917 13.32 10.32 0.71 63.23  1047 14.22 11.60 0.71 63.23 -2.10** 
 Capital 1714 53.69 27.34 6.17 177.45  901 60.56 31.39 6.17 177.45 -5.56*** 
 Credit Risk 1345 10.02 12.37 0.00 72.19  626 12.17 14.57 0.00 72.19 -3.19*** 
†T-Stat. of mean equality test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table 2.Islamic Banking in Predominantly Muslim Countries 
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the equation (1) for the sample of Predominantly Muslim Countries:  
Yj,t = α0 + α11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + α12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + α13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +  α21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + α22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + α23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +        
α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t + α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Per_Capitaj,t + α7×Remittance_Inflowj,t + α8×Trendt + εj,t 
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median proportion of Muslims in a country’s population. Countries above the median value are classified in one group 
(PredominantlyMuslim Countries). The median value is 95%.  
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, MediumISB Shareand Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we study 
the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation. Columns (4) to (9) present our analysis for economic growth, income inequality and 
poverty index. 
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable definitions. 
 Funding Mobilization and Allocation  Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Poverty Index 
 Bank Deposit Financial System Deposit Private Credit  Economic Growth Gini Poverty Ratio International Poverty Ratio National Poverty Gap International Poverty Ratio Rural 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Small ISB Share 0.009 -0.003 -0.018  -0.026 2.606 -6.921 69.527*** -4.377 --- 
 (0.38) (-0.12) (-0.71)  (-0.99) (0.29) (-0.28) (12.80) (-0.58)  
Medium ISB Share 0.040** 0.040** 0.066**  0.016 -0.064** -0.036 -0.131*** -0.012 -0.044*** 
 (2.56) (2.65) (2.42)  (0.55) (-3.20) (-0.42) (-3.50) (-0.44) (-4.74) 
Large ISB Share 0.032 0.004 0.024  -0.022 -0.037 0.057 -0.303*** 0.027 1.202** 
 (1.10) (0.16) (1.00)  (-1.55) (-0.57) (0.42) (-5.13) (0.68) (3.09) 
Small ISW Share -0.005 0.003 0.001  0.033* 0.051*** -0.030 -0.438*** -0.006 -0.670*** 
 (-0.28) (0.20) (0.06)  (2.14) (4.77) (-1.09) (-13.00) (-0.75) (-22.36) 
Medium ISW Share 0.022 0.036 0.066  0.037 -0.017 -0.045 -0.975*** -0.010 -2.038*** 
 (0.64) (0.97) (0.74)  (1.06) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-8.87) (-0.29) (-8.02) 
Large ISW Share 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.138***  -0.030 -0.064*** 0.158*** 0.874*** 0.029*** 4.422*** 
 (3.97) (3.63) (3.34)  (-1.27) (-5.39) (10.62) (7.88) (6.26) (5.32) 
Foreign Banks Share -0.008 -0.012 0.030  -0.018 -0.023 -0.064 0.302** -0.040 0.254*** 
 (-0.16) (-0.19) (0.63)  (-0.50) (-0.27) (-0.23) (2.53) (-0.47) (26.39) 
State Banks Share -0.052 -0.076 -0.017  -0.040 0.038 0.027 0.265** -0.001 0.025 
 (-1.10) (-1.21) (-0.25)  (-1.18) (0.38) (0.20) (3.19) (-0.02) (1.79) 
Inflation -0.161* -0.164* -0.166***  -0.042 0.020 -0.060 0.071** -0.021 -0.201*** 
 (-2.10) (-2.06) (-3.36)  (-0.86) (1.05) (-1.22) (2.51) (-1.52) (-84.73) 
Per Capita 0.217 0.283 0.299  0.488** -0.163 0.194 -3.356*** 0.036 -5.865*** 
 (1.04) (1.36) (0.68)  (3.21) (-0.63) (1.01) (-16.10) (0.65) (-189.59) 
Remittance Inflow 0.357 0.506 0.664  0.141 0.440** -0.007 -2.678*** -0.056 -3.237*** 
 (1.17) (1.73) (1.56)  (1.79) (2.95) (-0.01) (-6.94) (-0.27) (-7.75) 
Trend 1.016*** 0.967*** 0.765***  -0.276*** -0.295 -0.577*** 0.250 -0.151*** 0.718*** 
 (6.99) (6.43) (4.28)  (-4.88) (-1.26) (-3.82) (1.30) (-3.71) (4.35) 
Constant 28.011*** 28.853*** 15.228**  1.287 40.364*** 15.382 47.887*** 5.430 33.752** 
 (8.61) (7.82) (2.38)  (0.54) (11.62) (1.12) (8.10) (1.30) (2.70) 
Observations 108 104 107  113 28 28 27 28 22 
R-squared 0.635 0.619 0.578  0.182 0.845 0.752 0.987 0.732 0.984 
Number of Country 10 10 10  10 8 8 8 8 7 
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Table 3. Islamic Banking in Low Income Countries  
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the equation (1) for the sample of Low Income Countries:   
Yj,t = α0 + α11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + α12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + α13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +  α21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + α22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + α23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +        
α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t + α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Per_Capitaj,t + α7×Remittance_Inflowj,t + α8×Trendt + εj,t 
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of countries’ Per Capita. Countries below the median value are classified in one group (called Low Income 
Countries). The median value is about $ 6,300.  
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we 
study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation. Columns (4) to (9) present our analysis for economic growth, income 
inequality and poverty index.  
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable definitions. 
 Funding Mobilization and Allocation  Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Poverty Index 
 Bank Deposit Financial System Deposit Private Credit  Economic Growth Gini Poverty Ratio International Poverty Ratio National Poverty Gap International Poverty Ratio Rural 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Small ISB Share -0.006 -0.007 0.036  -0.011 0.051 -0.069 -0.105 -0.033 -0.129 
 (-0.25) (-0.26) (1.14)  (-0.52) (1.39) (-1.18) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.16) 
Medium ISB Share 0.073** 0.072* 0.095  0.042*** 0.052 -0.177*** -0.096 -0.052** -0.190* 
 (2.69) (2.14) (1.76)  (3.38) (0.94) (-3.49) (-1.73) (-3.06) (-2.20) 
Large ISB Share 0.058 0.018 0.028  -0.026 -0.087 0.165 0.179 0.037 -0.171 
 (1.43) (0.57) (1.79)  (-1.83) (-0.69) (1.40) (1.40) (1.31) (-0.62) 
Small ISW Share 0.017 0.028 0.053**  0.003 0.047* 0.038 0.021 0.013 -0.024 
 (1.24) (1.70) (2.54)  (0.21) (1.92) (0.63) (0.76) (0.62) (-0.47) 
Medium ISW Share 0.107* 0.108 0.073  0.021 0.068 -0.008 0.052** -0.001 -0.039 
 (1.86) (1.81) (1.81)  (1.32) (1.15) (-0.16) (2.37) (-0.04) (-0.55) 
Large ISW Share 0.161** 0.167** 0.068  -0.019 -0.090 0.127** 0.144 0.015 -0.239 
 (2.94) (2.91) (1.71)  (-0.83) (-1.65) (2.36) (1.63) (0.70) (-0.92) 
Foreign Banks Share -0.127 -0.137 -0.106  0.024 0.050 -0.185 -0.082 -0.045 -0.075 
 (-1.64) (-1.69) (-1.61)  (0.50) (0.33) (-1.50) (-0.96) (-1.29) (-0.90) 
State Banks Share -0.242** -0.263** -0.052  -0.006 0.090 -0.099 0.036 -0.013 -0.014 
 (-2.93) (-2.91) (-1.32)  (-0.26) (1.21) (-0.81) (1.00) (-0.30) (-0.18) 
Inflation -0.180** -0.174 -0.075  0.035 -0.338* 0.546* 0.232 0.176* 0.082 
 (-2.50) (-1.53) (-1.20)  (1.65) (-1.95) (1.83) (0.86) (1.97) (0.36) 
Remittance Inflow 0.104 0.219 0.551  0.194 -0.045 0.687 0.413 0.146 0.994 
 (0.29) (0.66) (1.83)  (1.35) (-0.10) (1.11) (0.48) (0.86) (1.37) 
Trend 0.588 0.521 0.180  -0.130 0.070 -1.091*** -0.265 -0.363*** -0.492 
 (1.53) (1.38) (0.48)  (-1.24) (0.89) (-3.98) (-0.63) (-3.28) (-0.96) 
Constant 44.448*** 46.199*** 24.781***  0.408 34.169*** 27.361*** 22.618*** 7.592*** 42.316*** 
 (7.00) (7.16) (4.77)  (0.15) (6.86) (5.19) (4.24) (5.13) (4.01) 
Observations 105 101 104  110 28 32 32 32 30 
R-squared 0.435 0.413 0.309  0.168 0.546 0.761 0.737 0.750 0.642 
Number of Country 10 10 10  10 10 10 9 10 9 
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Table 4. Islamic Banking in High Uncertainty Avoidance Countries  
 
This table illustrates the estimation of the equation (1) for the sample of High Uncertainty Avoidance Countries:   
Yj,t = α0 + α11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + α12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + α13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +  α21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + α22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + α23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +        
α3×Foreign_Banks_Sharej,t + α4×State_Banks_Sharej,t + α5×Inflationj,t + α6×Per_Capitaj,t + α7×Remittance_Inflowj,t + α8×Trendt + εj,t 
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of countries’ uncertainty avoidance index. Countries below the median value are classified in one group 
(called High Uncertainty Avoidance Countries). The median value is 68.  
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we 
study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation. Columns (4) to (9) present our analysis for economic growth, income 
inequality and poverty index.  
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable definitions. 
 Funding Mobilization and Allocation  Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Poverty Index 
 Bank Deposit Financial System Deposit Private Credit  Economic Growth Gini Poverty Ratio International Poverty Ratio National Poverty Gap International Poverty Ratio Rural 
Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Small ISB Share -0.019 -0.029 0.009  -0.025 1.943 10.599 57.416 1.524  
 (-0.99) (-1.50) (0.42)  (-1.27) (0.18) (0.38) (1.20) (0.21)  
Medium ISB Share 0.072* 0.079* 0.097*  0.017 -0.032 -0.036 -0.381** -0.010 -0.623*** 
 (2.04) (1.96) (2.14)  (0.61) (-1.56) (-0.73) (-3.62) (-0.76) (-11.35) 
Large ISB Share 0.042 0.007 0.008  -0.017 -0.017 -0.043 -0.425 -0.006 -0.531** 
 (1.47) (0.32) (0.34)  (-0.86) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-1.46) (-0.12) (-3.83) 
Small ISW Share 0.000 0.009 0.031  0.014 0.050*** -0.037 -0.145** -0.011 -0.333*** 
 (0.01) (0.68) (1.12)  (0.93) (4.88) (-0.89) (-3.03) (-1.14) (-9.18) 
Medium ISW Share 0.070 0.077* 0.013  0.028 -0.003 0.116*** -0.049 0.034*** -0.462*** 
 (1.79) (2.01) (0.18)  (1.20) (-0.23) (5.20) (-0.63) (5.39) (-16.41) 
Large ISW Share 0.196*** 0.209*** 0.131*  -0.016 -0.053 0.148*** 0.196* 0.032*** -0.183 
 (4.25) (4.05) (1.86)  (-0.75) (-1.82) (5.16) (2.20) (8.29) (-1.29) 
Foreign Banks Share -0.017 -0.033 -0.025  -0.029 -0.048 0.214 0.785 0.046 -0.096** 
 (-0.27) (-0.40) (-0.26)  (-0.93) (-0.37) (0.67) (1.47) (0.54) (-2.59) 
State Banks Share -0.119 -0.155 -0.035  -0.053* -0.017 0.166 0.595 0.040 0.360*** 
 (-1.23) (-1.31) (-0.32)  (-2.12) (-0.15) (0.74) (1.62) (0.67) (11.63) 
Inflation -0.165* -0.171* -0.220**  -0.034 0.018 -0.016 0.224* -0.009 0.199*** 
 (-2.17) (-2.19) (-2.90)  (-0.69) (1.27) (-0.51) (2.18) (-0.89) (5.07) 
Per Capita 0.347 0.399 0.230  0.415*** 0.132 -0.418 -4.992*** -0.132 -11.036*** 
 (1.18) (1.35) (0.66)  (3.84) (1.28) (-1.08) (-6.44) (-1.51) (-22.55) 
Remittance Inflow 0.518 0.685 0.093  0.230* 0.423** 0.441 0.130 0.084 -3.836*** 
 (1.09) (1.43) (0.09)  (1.91) (2.60) (0.60) (0.12) (0.42) (-13.64) 
Trend 0.931** 0.852* 0.324  -0.182** -0.508*** 0.044 2.157** 0.023 7.684*** 
 (2.73) (2.16) (0.52)  (-2.96) (-3.88) (0.19) (2.64) (0.47) (13.82) 
Constant 33.229*** 35.501*** 28.216*  0.634 39.175*** -2.601 18.989 -0.411 94.240*** 
 (5.95) (5.07) (1.93)  (0.22) (8.89) (-0.24) (0.82) (-0.14) (23.99) 
Observations 104 100 106  119 28 28 27 28 22 
R-squared 0.557 0.516 0.382  0.161 0.854 0.833 0.871 0.833 0.963 
Number of Country 11 11 12  12 8 8 7 8 6 
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Table 5.Cost-Inefficiency Analysis 
 
This table presents the estimation of the Equation (2), using the ratio of total noninterest expense on total operating income 
(Inefficiency) as the proxy for inefficiency: 
Inefficiencyi,t = β0 +  β11×Small_ISB_Sharej,t + β12×Medium_ISB_Sharej,t + β13×Large_ISB_Sharej,t +   
β21×Small_ISW_Sharej,t + β22×Medium_ISW_Sharej,t + β23×Large_ISW_Sharej,t +       
β3×HHIj,t + β4×Domestic_Interest_Ratej,t + β5×Per_Capitaj,t + β6×Per_Capita_Growthj,t +  
β7×Capitali,t + β8×Sizei,t +β9×Credit Riski,t +  β10,y × Year_Dummiest,y
12
𝑦=1  + ξi,t 
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median proportion of Muslims in a country’s population. Countries below 
the median value are classified in one group (called More Religiously Diverse Countries) and the rest are in the other group 
(called Predominantly Muslim Countries). The median value is 95%. The results for More Religiously Diverse Countries are 
presented in columns (1) to (4), whereas columns (5) to (8) display our analysis for Predominantly Muslim Countries.  
We regress Inefficiency on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share)and control 
variables. In the first column we regress Inefficiency on Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share while 
controlling for Small ISW Share, Medium ISW Share and Large ISW Share. In column (2), we include HHI, Domestic Interest 
Rate, Per Capita, and Per Capita Growth in our model. Column (3) illustrates the result when we add Capital, Sizeand Credit 
Risk to our model. In column (4) we add year dummies. Columns (5) to (8) depict the result when we use the Predominantly 
Muslim Countries subsample. Year dummies are included but not reported in the table. 
We apply the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See table A1 for variable 
definitions. 
 More Religiously Diverse Countries  Predominantly Muslim Countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Small ISB Share -0.034** -0.045** -0.035 -0.037  -0.000 -0.010 -0.007 0.026 
 (-2.00) (-2.38) (-1.48) (-1.42)  (-0.00) (-0.23) (-0.13) (0.39) 
Medium ISB Share -0.004 -0.025 -0.032 -0.035  -0.110** -0.093* -0.101* 0.012 
 (-0.14) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.94)  (-2.27) (-1.68) (-1.81) (0.17) 
Large ISB Share -0.068* -0.054 -0.008 0.029  -0.125* -0.083 -0.334** -0.367** 
 (-1.73) (-0.95) (-0.11) (0.41)  (-1.85) (-1.16) (-2.23) (-2.40) 
Small ISW Share 0.040 0.023 0.014 -0.001  0.049 0.034 -0.074 -0.089 
 (1.43) (0.84) (0.26) (-0.02)  (0.45) (0.32) (-0.50) (-0.60) 
Medium ISW Share -0.036 -0.101** -0.161** -0.145**  0.168 0.181 -0.031 -0.172 
 (-0.85) (-2.10) (-2.54) (-2.21)  (1.54) (1.45) (-0.17) (-0.85) 
Large ISW Share -0.057 -0.137*** -0.168*** -0.137**  0.125 0.157 -0.090 -0.001 
 (-1.09) (-2.67) (-2.87) (-2.15)  (0.41) (0.50) (-0.65) (-0.01) 
HHI  -0.030 -0.059 -0.047   -0.212 0.303 0.287 
  (-0.37) (-0.51) (-0.38)   (-1.09) (1.64) (1.24) 
Domestic Interest Rate  0.126 0.287 0.083   0.444*** 0.472*** 0.333 
  (0.55) (0.97) (0.17)   (3.13) (2.76) (1.63) 
Per Capita  -0.162*** -0.139** -0.121*   -0.386 0.880* 0.635 
  (-3.32) (-2.38) (-1.78)   (-0.78) (1.68) (0.36) 
Per Capita Growth  -0.219* -0.146 -0.149   0.173 0.232 0.034 
  (-1.68) (-1.12) (-0.99)   (0.61) (0.64) (0.09) 
Capital   -0.053 -0.026    -0.259* -0.172 
   (-0.38) (-0.17)    (-1.92) (-1.24) 
Size   -0.719 -0.323    -1.267 -0.434 
   (-0.82) (-0.35)    (-0.75) (-0.27) 
Credit Risk   0.129 0.130    0.492*** 0.384** 
   (1.31) (1.32)    (3.18) (2.59) 
Constant 56.8*** 61.1*** 69.6*** 66.3***  61.3*** 62.0*** 59.3* 51.7 
 (46.45) (21.01) (5.24) (4.65)  (23.28) (9.73) (1.97) (1.13) 
          
Year Dummies No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
          
Observations 1,714 1,677 1,179 1,179  901 855 506 506 
R-squared 0.007 0.014 0.030 0.041  0.019 0.074 0.187 0.246 
Number of Banks 248 247 219 219  145 135 100 100 
 
